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Some Comments on Bowers
John D. Ayer*
What are you gonna do now, Leander? The feds have got the atom
bomb.1
Times change. Thirty years ago, law professors took a be-
nign, not to say irenic, view of the possibilities of government
intervention. Not everyone endorsed the bomb-throwing ex-
cesses of the Great Society, but there was more or less general
agreement that good people with good hearts could put matters
right through good law. Today, no one would admit that sort of
thing unless he or she wants to be thought of as hopelessly be-
hind the times. The beau ideal of the new elite of legal academ-
ics is not as much John Marshall or Benjamin Cardozo as it is
Milo Minderbinder, the hero of Catch-22 who bought eggs for
seven cents apiece and sold them for five cents at a six cent
profit.2 Jim Bowers thus operates in the establishment main-
stream when he proposes abolishing the filing system under Ar-
ticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as a means of achieving
the goals of Article 9. 3
Precisely because the notion of economic efficiency is so pop-
ular, we need to be extra careful not to get swept up in our own
enthusiasms. Although we will surely fail, we must try to detect
and eradicate our own metaphysical blind spots. Start with the
dichotomy of government, or public, versus private. We need to
remember that our opponent is not the government, per se. Our
opponent is the idea of rent seeking.4 For example, we might
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1963, J.D.
1986, Louisville; LL.M. 1969, Yale.
1. Bill Rose, Louisiana Family's Feud Shatters 50-Year Dynasty: The Pe-
rez Dictatorship is Losing Grip on Parish, Mrix HERALD, Jan. 20, 1983, at 1A(quoting Louisiana Governor Earl Long in a conversation with Plaquemines
County patriarch, Leander Perez, on principles of sovereignty and the separa-
tion of powers).
2. JOSEPH HLLER, CATcH-22 226-27 (Simon and Schuster 1961) (1955).
3. James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats, Brothers-in-Law and Bankruptcy
Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 MINN. L.
REv. 721 (1995).
4. Rent seeking is "the opportunit[y] to exploit informational asymme-
tries," which leads to economic inefficiency. Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Arti-
745
746 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:745
blindly assume that although both the government and Citibank
are rent seekers, life under the dominion of the Citibank
workout department would be sweeter and more fulfilling. That
is not, however, necessarily so. The question of who is in fact the
better rent seeker remains an empirical question.5
Privatization presents a similar problem. Economic rheto-
ric pays listless lip service to the notion that deadweight costs
might afflict nongovernment transactions. 6 Any defense of
cle 9, 80 VA. L. Rxv. 1783, 1801-02 (1994). In the "mythology" of Article 9, the
filing system mitigates the opportunity for rent seeking by making information
available. This information is "principally for the benefit of those creditors who
are subject to the limitations of the first-in-time principle." Id. at 1801. See
also Bowers, supra note 3, at 725-33 (arguing that the Article 9 filing system is
economically inefficient).
Opposition to rent seeking is itself, of course, a metaphysical shibboleth.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 294-95 (1988)
(discussing the "significant social costs" imposed by rent seeking statutes that
concentrate benefits on special interest groups while distributing costs across
society). Sooner or later, probably sooner, someone will make an academic rep-
utation by showing that rent seeking is a positive social good. For the moment,
however, I accept opposition to rent seeking as the rock on which we can rest
our faith. See Allan W. Vestal, Public Choice, Public Interest, and The Soft
Drink Interbrand Competition Act: Time to Derail the 'Root Beer Express"?, 34
WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 337, 348-49 (1993). Because it is difficult to distinguish
between governmental activities that involve rent seeking and those that in-
volve the public interest, "the public choice model essentially ignores the possi-
bility" of public interest objectives and "disfavors virtually all rent-seeking
legislation." Id.
5. A related approach to this problem is to ask who is the government.
For example, we can imagine a world in which the Citibank workout depart-
ment acquires its own Air Force and the power to exact taxes while eschewing
any explicit claim to government power. Something of this sort seems to be
happening in post-communist Russia, where investors are finding that they
must equip themselves with paramilitary forces to support private investment
goals. One United States firm, for example, pays $12,000 a year to a British
company for protection from local racketeers. Lee Hockstader, A Time of
Thieves: Organized Crime in Post-Soviet Russia (pts. 1 & 2), WASH. PosT, Feb.
26, 1995, at Al, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al, A13. Of course, we might
define all successful rent seekers as the government, but this robs the notion of
any useful analytical content.
6. Economists have argued that private transactions are not always as
efficient as they could be. See, e.g., R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The Gen-
eral Theory of Second Best, 63 Rav. ECON. ST. 11, 11 (1956) (providing a gen-
eral theory of second best). Lipsey and Lancaster argue that "if there is
introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the
attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian conditions,
although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable." Id. In other
words, private actors will settle for a state of equilibrium that is "second best"
from the standpoint of economic efficiency. As a result, "an imperfectly compet-
itive economy may well diminish both the general productive efficiency of the
economy and the welfare of its members." Id.
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privatization as a means of avoiding the costs of rent seeking,
however, requires an explication as to precisely why that partic-
ular privatization, rather than privatization in general, serves
to reduce the net social cost of the governmental scheme.
Within the framework of requiring justification for specific
privatization schemes, let me suggest three parts of Bowers's
plan that seem to require more thought. First, Bowers needs to
state explicitly his understanding of the function of an Article 9
filing system. Second, Bowers needs to clarify his description of
the state of nature absent an Article 9 filing system, or, more
precisely, why he assumes the existence of the particular state
of nature that he does. And third, Bowers's proposal would
profit from a more comprehensive analysis of the different
means through which to eliminate rent seeking. I will discuss
these in sequence.
I. THE FUNCTION OF AN ARTICLE 9 FILING SYSTEM
Bowers asserts that Article 9 filing serves a notice purpose
only in that it merely provides a source of information for those
who believe they need it. 7 He may be right. I suggest, however,
that Article 9 also serves a validation function, which is a rather
different matter and requires separate analysis to determine
whether its filing system is desirable or efficient. Consider the
following case:
S2 is considering lending $100,000 to Debtor, to be secured by a wid-
get. On review of information furnished by Debtor, S2 learns that
Debtor previously granted a security interest in the same widget to S1.
Debtor also reports that she signed a financing statement containing a
description of that collateral. A search reveals, however, that the fi-
nancing statement was never put on file. S2 then undertakes to com-
plete the transaction with Debtor. Debtor signs a new financing
statement describing the collateral, which S2 files. In a subsequent
priority conflict between S1 and S2, who prevails?
If S2 is bound by Sl's unfied security interest because he
knew about it, then Article 9 filing is a notice mechanism only.
If S2 wins regardless of his knowledge, then Article 9 serves a
validation function independent from its notice function. Article
9 filing thus is a formal mechanism in the sense that it is mean-
ingful in determining the substantive rights of S1 and S2 but it
does not change the content of their respective agreements with
7. Bowers, supra note 3, at 725 ('The Article 9 filing system provides
nothing other than a simple commodity-information.") (citation omitted).
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Debtor." As Lon Fuller suggests, the interminable tension be-
tween function and form means that neither will ever triumph
completely over the other.9
Although Article 9 is a formal rule mandating that S2 has
priority over S1 in spite of his knowledge, it is entirely likely
that judges will treat Article 9 filing as a notice mechanism and
grant priority to S1 by employing trumping doctrines (perhaps
they are counterrules) such as estoppel or, heaven help us, bad
faith.10 Many judges who decide Article 9 cases have never been
exposed to commercial law, and their knowledge on the point
comprises at best a creative misreading of James White.11
Bowers does not explicitly state which of these possibilities
he embraces. My impression is that he vacillates somewhat. He
implies that the prior creditor is required to file to protect his
interest, which suggests a validation function.12 He also spends
some energy, however, discussing the availability of alternate
information sources and the possibility of competitive markets,
which seems to presuppose a regime of reliance.' 3 The distinc-
8. Form and substance are two important factors in assessing the enforce-
ability of a promise. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L.
REv. 799, 799 (1941) (discussing the "formal" and "substantive" aspects of con-
sideration). Gratuitous promises, for example, are not enforced because "such
promises are often made impulsively and without proper deliberation." Id. Be-
cause this objection is based on the form of the agreement, it disappears if the
promise is accompanied by "some formality or ceremony." Id. Yet, many argue
that enforcing gratuitous promises is not sufficiently important "to our social
and economic order to justify the expenditure of the time and energy necessary
to accomplish it." Id. "Here the objection is one of 'substance' since it touches
the significance of the promise made and not merely the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of it." Id. at 799-800. Reliance is another important ele-
ment in the enforceability of a promise. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in
the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 58, 59 (1981) ("In light of the important policies underlying considera-
tion and form, a court might well require... that the plaintiff seeking enforce-
ment demonstrate reliance that is both definite and substantial."). See
generally E. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds And Comparative Legal History, 63
LAw Q. REv. 174 (1947) (discussing the evolution of the Statute of Frauds).
9. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 799 (explaining the relation of form to the
substantive basis of contract liability).
10. Now, I must confess that I am not certain on this point, at least not
certain enough that I would be willing to sign an opinion letter on it.
11. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation,
26 Loy. LA. L. REv. 823, 824 (1993) (proposing the repeal of § 9-301(1)(b),
which grants priority to the first to file).
12. Bowers, supra note 3, at 726 ("Transacting parties must file before they
can make the benefits of their dealings enforceable against strangers.").
13. See generally id. at 725-33 (explaining that the function of Article 9 is
to provide information and that an efficient market would provide the same
services if they were truly valuable). Perhaps Bowers visualizes shifting from a
[Vol. 79:745
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tion is important. If the goal is to eliminate the filing system,
the rationale for doing so will vary depending on the function of
the system. Indeed, recognizing the distinction might make it
possible to achieve more analytical precision as to whether the
function of the system is validation or notice.
If filing serves a notice purpose only, then the issue involves
the relative merits of different sorts of notice. One might say,
for example, that it is easier, cheaper, or more expeditious to get
information from county clerks than it is from Dun & Brad-
street, or the reverse. Empirical evidence dictates the truth of
either assertion. Issues such as the potential economies of dif-
ferent sorts of notice systems and the possibility of contestable
markets in information then become relevant. 14
On the other hand, if Article 9 filing serves a validation pur-
pose, one must employ a different sort of analysis. One needs to
show not merely that the private market is a more efficient in-
formation provider, but also that formalism itself is discredited
and ought to be abandoned.
H. BOWERS'S STATE OF NATURE
Similarly, Bowers needs to clarify his view of the state of
nature. He assumes that doing away with the filing system
leaves us with a regime in which security interests are valid
against competing claimants, whether or not the competing
claimants knew, or could have known, about them. There may
be such a state of nature, but I have not seen it. My reading of
pre-UCC history suggests a far more complicated picture, and
for Bowers, a more troublesome one. Specifically, the state of
nature Article 9 addresses can be understood as a classic eternal
triangle of economic interests. In such a scenario, two or more
parties have claims against a third, and there is not enough col-
lateral to go around. The reason this triangle is a problem in the
absence of Article 9 is not, as Bowers's assumption suggests,
that each side can deploy equally plausible state of nature rheto-
system of validation to a system of reliance. This is a coherent position, but it
does not obviate my point here.
14. Although I may seem to suggest that formalism requires some degree
of government monopoly, I would not go quite that far. I am aware, for exam-
ple, that we accept many items as private money regardless of the government's
effort to maintain a monopoly. Although it is possible to imagine a private mar-
ket in which entrepreneurs both evidence and validate transactions, I cannot
imagine exactly how it would work-nor does it seem that Bowers has done so.
See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing the role of semiprivate
filing systems).
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ric to justify his claim. The prior creditor typically has the logic
of property, contract, and priority on his side. On the other
hand, the subsequent creditor may have a weaker case with re-
gard to priority and property. The subsequent creditor, how-
ever, has an equally valid claim based on contract, and she has
an additional and equally compelling argument based on osten-
sible ownership. Bowers can eliminate the filing system, but he
cannot eliminate the ideological tension in competing claims
that led to Article 9 in the first place.
Ironically, if the state of nature points in any direction here,
it is probably points to the reverse of the one Bowers supposes.
Traditionally, we associate the right of the prior claimant with
the notion of a property right. She has ownership that no one
can impair without her consent. The subsequent claimant can
assert security of transaction. That is, a party ought to be able
to make deals cheaply and depend on appearances in making
them. This is the reason, for example, that we have a regime in
which a store clerk does not demand two forms of identification
before accepting a twenty dollar bill for payment.
Typically, the rhetoric in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries asserted that the commerce position was modern
and fashionable. The property interest position, on the other
hand, was terminally retrograde, medieval. The drafters of Arti-
cle 9 thus understood themselves as coming not to destroy but to
fulfill a vision of private ordering, a vision free from extraneous
interference.
IlI. ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ELIMINATE RENT
SEEKING
Bowers should consider the problem of rent seeking at a
somewhat higher level of abstraction. In doing so, he would rec-
ognize that there are any number of means or devices through
which to thwart or finesse rent seeking.
The campaign in support of Article 9 is a campaign to limit
rent seeking. I am not saying that the proponents were correct
in their appraisal of the world. They may have been badly mis-
taken. No one can deny, however, that the whole point of the
Article 9 movement was to accomplish precisely the result that
Bowers seeks here. Indeed everyone understood that the en-
trenched county clerks, who profited by exacting a toll for cross-
ing the transactional bridge, would constitute the principal
source of opposition. This is the reason Article 9 implements
central filing and uncouples the financing statement from the
[Vol. 79:745
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security agreement. Indeed, Bowers should recognize that the
problem in Louisiana has not been the success of Article 9 but,
rather, that Article 9 has not been successful enough.
The drafters of Article 9, of course, could have chosen to
depend on private ordering for informational needs rather than
creating a filing system. Before the UCC, plenty of case law
sorting out the rights of competing claimants on the grounds of
estoppel or ostensible ownership supported such a choice. In-
deed, to a certain extent the drafters did depend on private or-
dering. Unlike today's version of Article 9, which favors a "races
system,15 the original version of Article 9 clearly favored a "race-
notice" scheme of perfection in certain circumstances. 16
The drafters, however, added the device of filing. The justi-
fication for the device of filing was that it was more economical
in social welfare terms than devices extant at the time. This
rationale is even more persuasive if one views Article 9 as a vali-
dation instead of merely an informational statute. To the extent
that Article 9 appeals to notions of formalism, it invokes all the
conventional arguments in favor of formalism. These argu-
ments are, in large part, arguments about the supposed econo-
mies of Article 9. To use familiar examples: if all money has to
pass a formal test, then we save the time and cost of weighing
and assaying; or, if all trains run on schedule, then fewer people
miss trains.
Once again, I am not saying that any of these arguments
were, in fact, true when the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws created, and state legislatures
adopted, Article 9, or that they remain true today. My point is
only that Bowers's arguments in support of his proposal to abol-
ish the filing requirement, however factually correct they might
be, are not revolutionary in principle. Anyone who wants to
weigh the evidence again should recall that the evidence has al-
ready been weighed before.
It is also proper to consider a variety of intermediate devices
that the UCC may invoke to limit the social welfare cost of filing.
The UCC already exempts some transactions from the filing re-
quirement, such as security interests in consumer goods. In the
same vein, the drafters of a special set of Article 2A rules gov-
15. In other words, the first to file is first in right regardless of notice.
U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(a), 9-312(5) (1990).
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962) (an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of "a person who becomes a lien creditor without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected") (emphasis added).
1995]
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erning equipment leasing might have intended to avoid the bur-
den of a filing system.17 Presumably a conclusive defense of
Article 2A would have to show that the savings in not filing out-
weigh any costs that arise from the lack of a filing requirement.
I know of no attempt either to prove or disprove that reading of
Article 2A. My own intuition is that the proponents of Article
2A could meet the burden of such a cost-benefit analysis. The
Article 2A example is particularly instructive because exemp-
tion from the filing requirement is coupled with the option of
filing for those seeking a comprehensive plan of self-protection.
I do not know how widespread optional filing is, but do I believe
that it is widespread. This would suggest that counsel for credi-
tors believe that it is a cost-effective means of protecting their
clients, or themselves, from a certain kind of risk.
Other modifications are possible. A number of critics have
pointed out that the animating principle of Article 9 is the con-
flict between the secured creditor and the bankruptcy trustee.
Critics have also asserted that present rules governing the con-
flict often seem to operate in an arbitrary or accidental way. Jim
White has pointed out that we could obviate these problems by
removing filing from the list of conditions necessary for a se-
cured creditor to triumph over the trustee.18
It is worth noting that White's recommendation marks a
radical departure in terms of the structure of the Bankruptcy
Code as a whole. Compare the treatment of real property.
Under the law of many states, an unrecorded security interest in
real estate trumps a lien creditor and also will trump a bank-
ruptcy trustee. In effect, that is White's proposal. As bank-
ruptcy lawyers know, however, it does not end there. With
respect to the real estate claim, the bankruptcy trustee also has
the power of a bona fide purchaser, which puts her effectively
back in control. It is not at all clear why the Bankruptcy Code
gives the trustee this kind of power. It is hard to conceive, how-
17. See John D. Ayer, An Unrepentant View of the Sale-Lease Distinction, 4
J. BANHR. L. & PRAc. 290 (1995). This does not mean the motive was to relieve
clients of the expense of filing. More likely it was to relieve transactional law-
yers of the embarrassment of failing to file. I am not certain that this was the
primary motive for Article 2A. Another contender is the desire of law profes-
sionals to claim their place in the hall of fame of uniform lawmakers.
18. See White, supra note 11, at 824. White notes that "[t]he direct and
most obvious effect" of his proposal "would be to subordinate a creditor who had
procured a judicial lien-usually after judgment and levy-to an unperfected
secured creditor who had a security interest in the personal property on which
the lien creditor levied." Id.
[Vol. 79:745
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ever, that it could be the result of rent seeking by the lobby of
Louisiana county clerks. 19
CONCLUSION
The tenor of these remarks may seem to cast doubt on the
substantive merit of Bowers's proposal. But, in fact, I am more
agnostic. It is easy to conjure up lines of inquiry that support,
rather than oppose, his suggestion. For example, Bowers has
suggested that the rent seeking clerks at the courthouse are a
powerful constituency helping to maintain a filing system that
lines their own pockets. Another constituency that, in principal,
also stands to gain from a filing system is the constituency of
attorneys who plan transactions for institutional creditors. Af-
ter all, it is the attorneys, not their clients, who draft reform
statutes. In additionally, the interests of lawyers and clients
often diverge on important issues. A likely justification for Arti-
cle 2A is that it relieves lawyers of the embarrassment of nonfil-
ing. It could, however, be the other way around. It may be that
the virtue of the filing system is that it gives lawyers the assur-
ance they need to write opinion letters validating transactions.
Under these circumstances, the attorney can pass the cost back
to the client. It is entirely consistent to suppose that both of
these seemingly opposite propositions are true. That is, lawyers
like filing when it makes it easier to validate opinion letters and
dislike it where the costs of mistakes are too high.
In a somewhat different vein, I assume Bowers would ac-
knowledge that not all filing systems are alike. If one were as-
sessing the relative costs and benefits of a filing system, one
would want to know which filing systems are most cost-effective
and why.20 This is particularly interesting in view of Bowers's
Louisiana example, in which clerks keep records centrally but
secured parties file locally. An uninformed individual might
guess that such a system was more competitive and therefore
19. A superficially attractive reason for the pro-trustee bias is that some of
the high priests in the church of bankruptcy have a settled populist distrust of
professional institutional creditors. I think this is probably true in fact, but it
explains nothing. It does not say why this settled populist distrust existed, nor
does it explain how the bank came in conflict with the rent seekers.
20. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should
Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MiNN. L. REV.
577, 585-93 (1995) (discussing the costs and benefits of various filing systems);
see also Edward S. Adams et al., A Revised Filing System: Recommendations
and Innovations, 79 MwN. L. Rv. 877, 889-910 (1995) (discussing the same,
particularly with respect to the technological aspects of filing).
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more cost-effective than a system with a sole provider. Appar-
ently, however, nothing of the sort is the case. Evidently the
county clerks have done an effective job of drawing wagons into
a circle around their tents. Why this holds true, and what it will
take to break it up, is a line of inquiry all its own.
As a corollary, one would do well to consider the role of
semiprivate filing systems elsewere. Bowers himself speaks of
commercial providers like Dun & Bradstreet. There is some dis-
couraging evidence about the role of private credit reporting
agencies. The bond rating agencies are currently taking heat for
not blowing the whistle on Orange County, which is in bank-
ruptcy as a result of bad luck with a high risk investment pol-
icy. 21 A widely held belief exists that conventional bond rating
agencies downgrade bond issues only after the market has as-
similated the information on which the downgrading is based.
In California, for example, the business of processing land titles
remains almost exclusively the province of private title insur-
ance companies. These companies maintain their own elaborate
title plants on which they base their opinions. I realize that the
example is not precisely parallel to Bowers's. The title compa-
nies are not totally independent. They distribute information at
retail that the state furnishes both at wholesale and at retail.
Knowing more about the relation between the public and private
land title processors, including the extent of the stake title com-
panies hold in maintaining an inefficient state system so that
customers will embrace the private providers, would be
worthwhile.
Finally, to know whether we should do away with a filing
system, we would need to know to what extent lawyers and cli-
ents actually rely on filing today. If the cost of filing is unaccept-
ably high, one can attempt to structure transactions around it
by, for example, leasing instead of using direct collateral secur-
ity. One can also ignore it and choose to either police collateral
and debtors more carefully, consciously choose to assimilate the
risk as a cost of doing business through self-insurance, or some
combination thereof.
I offer these thoughts in a positive and largely sympathetic
frame of mind. Bowers and I share a large common ground here.
We both serve as acolytes of First Church of Transactional and
Social Welfare Efficiency. It is important to remember who is
the enemy. It is not the government; rather, it is inefficiency in
21. See Nell Henderson, Orange County Planning to Sue Three Brokerages,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 1994, at F2 (discussing Orange County's fiscal crisis).
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the form of rent seeking. If we oppose the government when the
government is in fact the more efficient provider of a desired ser-
vice, we increase, rather than reduce, the amount of inefficiency
in the world. My purpose here is only to outline some lines of
inquiry that we should pursue before concluding that the gov-
ernment is, in fact, the target.

